Those operating in the Middle East at the behest of Iran for Iran and Syria have been identified, now what? Saudi Arabia with the cooperation of other Gulf nations has been quite assertive to end the conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Iraq and so forth yet Iran, Syria and Russia have zero interest in stopping Assad. How long into the future will this fester and will it eventually plateau only when the United States has a new president and who can lead and be effective among the candidates?
Iran won’t surrender militias that conduct Assad’s war
Not long before the Riyadh-Tehran diplomatic row that followed the execution of Saudi Shia cleric Nimr Al Nimr, a showdown between the two countries unfolded in New York. While it is difficult to draw a direct correlation between the two events, the incident can help us understand the depth of the continuing crisis.
On December 18, heated debate ensued between representatives of the two countries at a meeting in New York over the listing of armed groups operating in Syria for possible determination as terrorist organisations. The list, which Jordan was asked to develop, would name extremist groups that must be defeated as part of the UN-sponsored political process for Syria.
A month earlier in Vienna, Saudi Arabia had insisted on including in the list foreign Shia militias fighting on the side of president Bashar Al Assad. Riyadh argued that all foreign fighters must leave Syria, regardless of which side they supported. In New York, Iran, joined by Russia, strongly objected to the demand and the standoff caused a deeper rift between the two countries.
For now, the designation of terror groups in Syria has been referred to a committee comprising several European and regional countries. They first determined indicators and criteria of what constitutes a terrorist organisation, then named armed groups currently fighting in Syria. There is a preliminary list of more than 160 Sunni and Shia organisations.
Iran categorically rejects including any Shia groups in the list. For Tehran, the fate of the Assad regime it supports is critically tied to the presence of those Shia militias. It is a fact that adds to the many issues that compound the conflict in Syria – issues that the international community would seemingly rather sweep under the carpet instead of deal with head on.
The Syrian regime controls about 30 per cent of the country, though it probably controls over 50 per cent of the population. According to the defence think tank IHS Jane’s, the regime lost 16 per cent of its territory over the past year. These figures are particularly damning if one considers that foreign Shia militias were on the front line of key battles against the rebels – in the Qalamoun region, Aleppo and central and western Syria – over this period.
The growing role of these militias last year came as the Syrian army showed signs of internal weakening, something that Mr Al Assad has admitted. During his most recent speech, almost exactly a month before the Russian intervention in September, the president said that the army lacked “manpower”. Also last year, paramilitary fighters with the National Defence Forces (NDF) began to focus on their local areas rather than deploy in the front lines elsewhere – a task that foreign fighters took on.
Youssef Sadaki, a Syrian researcher who closely focuses on Shia militias, says those foreign fighters acted as the main strikers in battles outside the regime’s heartlands, while the NDF fighters defended their areas or secured and held newly-captured areas.
According to Mr Sadaki, foreign militias lead the regime’s battles in southern Aleppo, and the front lines between Idlib, Aleppo, Latakia, Homs and Hama. Hizbollah has spearheaded key battles in southern Syria near the Lebanese borders, while other militias guard the front lines in Damascus and fought in Deraa.
Phillip Smyth, a close observer of Shia militancy, says that most of the regime’s offensives over the past two years were led by foreign forces, including in areas where the regime’s elite units operate, such as in Damascus.
“When we look at Aleppo, the entire offensive there was spearheaded and planned by the Iranians, it was their Shia militia proxy forces which showcased the entire campaign,” said Mr Smyth, from the University of Maryland. “It’s quite clear that they are a – if not the main – fighting force in many areas.”
Last month on these pages, I highlighted that while Iran and Russia might in theory be willing to accept the removal of Mr Al Assad, there are practical reasons why they would not do that, because consequences are unpredictable and the result is not guaranteed.
For the rebels, no peace is possible while Mr Al Assad is in power, so his future complicates the peace talks. So does the presence of Shia militias in Syria.
Reliance on these foreign forces means that their departure will have to follow the consolidation of the government’s military control over the country. They operate in critical areas and the regime’s army or NDF do not appear to be prepared to take their place.
The presence of Shia militias is important for the regime and for its backer in Tehran. Many of these militias are also key Iranian proxies in Iraq, with recent reports suggesting that Iran has diverted them to Syria to assist in the wake of the Russian intervention in Syria. So the issue has also a regional dimension that cannot be ignored.
Iran finds itself in a situation where it seeks to save the regime in Syria through the help of religious zealots, while pushing for the designation as terrorists of Sunni extremists fighting on the side of the opposition.
In western capitals, strangely, that seems to be a reasonable position. For the opposition and regional backers such as Saudi Arabia, that is double dealing that further complicates the already-complex conflict in Syria.
Meanwhile, back to Iran and the big money. What future trouble will the monetary windfall coming for Iran play in the region?
FreeBeacon: Expert: ‘Kerry might as well have wired the money directly into the Revolutionary Guards’ bank accounts’
Iran’s economy is set to receive a substantial boost in the next two years as a result of billions in sanctions relief from the nuclear deal, according to a new forecast, a windfall that could also secure more resources for the Iranian military and its terrorist proxies.
The World Bank said in a report that Iran’s GDP is projected to increase by 5.8 percent this year, compared to just 1.9 percent last year. Economic growth is then estimated to rise by 6.7 percent in 2017.
As part of the nuclear agreement reached between Iran and world powers last year, the Islamic regime could collect as much as $150 billion in unfrozen assets from foreign accounts after it places some restrictions on its nuclear program. Tehran will also be permitted to resume more oil exports, which could increase its sales by 0.5 to 0.7 million barrels per day this year.
The nuclear deal “opens the door for reintegration of [Iran] into the global economy and the reinvigoration of its oil, natural gas, and automotive sectors,” the World Bank said in its global economic prospects report.
“Sanctions could begin to be lifted in early 2016 if the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) indicates the Iranian government has fulfilled its commitments under the pact,” the report continued. “Renewed optimism about the potential of the Iranian economy has already generated a flurry of investment interest by foreign companies.”
Michael Rubin, an expert on Iran and the Middle East at the American Enterprise Institute, said in an email that he also expects the Iranian economy to grow in the wake of the nuclear deal, though he cautioned that the World Bank can be too reliant on flawed statistics from Tehran. Rising growth in Iran would represent a stark contrast to the economic situation before the nuclear negotiations, when the country’s economy contracted under the weight of U.S.-led sanctions.
At the talks, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry turned in “probably the worst negotiating performance any U.S. secretary of state has had in the last century,” Rubin said, because he failed to pressure Iran into eliminating all aspects of its nuclear program.
“Rather than use Iran’s precarious economic situation as leverage in U.S. negotiations, Secretary of State John Kerry effectively caved,” said Rubin, who is also a former Pentagon official in the George W. Bush administration.
“The Obama administration effectively bailed Iran out,” he added.
Analysts have raised concerns that the Islamic regime could devote billions of its sanctions relief to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the elite paramilitary unit that also supports terrorist groups in Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen. The American Action Forum estimated last year that the Guard Corps’ budget could increase by about $3 billion after the nuclear deal is fully implemented.
“If Iran’s economy does grow—and that growth is not eroded from significant inflation from the hard currency influx—then the chief beneficiaries will be the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who have a stranglehold over the oil industry, import-export, and construction,” Rubin said. “Kerry might as well have wired the money directly into the Revolutionary Guards’ bank accounts, because that is the net effect.”
Iran could also use the sanctions relief to bolster its ballistic missile program. Iranian forces have tested two ballistic missiles since the nuclear agreement was reached, including one in October that was capable of carrying a nuclear warhead and violated a United Nations Security Council ban. President Hassan Rouhani has said the military should allocate more resources to its missile program if the United States decides to impose sanctions for the missile tests.
Additionally, an Iranian military with more funding could further exacerbate sectarian tensions in the Middle East. Following the execution of a Shiite cleric by Saudi Arabia, a Sunni Muslim nation and Iran’s bitter regional rival, Iranian protesters stormed the Saudi embassy in Tehran, prompting the Saudis to break off diplomatic relations. Iran has now accused a Saudi-led coalition of launching airstrikes near its embassy in Yemen.
Rubin warned that Iran previously capitalized on negotiations and trade in the early 2000s to augment its nuclear program.
“Between 1999 and 2005, Europe’s trade with Iran almost tripled and the price of oil about quintupled,” he said. “Iran put about 70 percent of that hard currency windfall into its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.”
“The reason for the expansion of Iran’s illicit programs early the last decade was too much diplomacy, not too little,” he continued. “The Supreme National Security Chairman at the time directing those programs? Hassan Rouhani. Kerry is simply making the same mistake twice.”
