Damn Hillary, What the Heck?

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So exactly how does the Hillary team and all her Democrat friends keep defending this? Maybe some questions need to be asked what violations of the Espionage Act is in their respective history.

What does Dianne Feinstein know? Are they emails between George and Amal Clooney and Hillary?

Off the shelf encryption software, unprotected mobile phone calls, text messages on foreign communications networks, and then has anyone asked if she shredded the hardcopies she always asked to be printed and delivered to her personally?

Hillary Clinton posted and shared the names of concealed U.S. intelligence officials on her unprotected email system.

Breitbart: Federal records reveal that Clinton swapped these highly classified names on an email account that was vulnerable to attack and was breached repeatedly by Russia-linked hacker attempts. These new revelations — reminiscent of the Valerie Plame scandal during George W. Bush’s tenure — could give FBI investigators the evidence they need to make a case that Clinton violated the Espionage Act by mishandling national defense information through “gross negligence.”

Numerous names cited in Clinton’s emails have been redacted in State Department email releases with the classification code “B3 CIA PERS/ORG,” a highly specialized classification that means the information, if released, would violate the Central Intelligence Act of 1949.

The State Department produced a document to Judicial Watch in April 2014 that identifies different types of “(b)(3)” redactions, including “CIA PERS/ORG,” which it defines as information “Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute … Central Intelligence Act of 1949.”

“That’s what it suggests,” Judicial Watch president Tom Fitton told Breitbart News, referring to the indication that Clinton disclosed the names of CIA-protected intelligence sources, based on the B3 redactions.

The CIA justifies “(b)(3)” redactions with this description: “(b)(3) Applies to the Director’s statutory obligations to protect from disclosure intelligence sources and methods, as well as the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency, in accord with the National Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1949, respectively.”

The State Department declined to comment. “Per the colleague who handles this issue, we are not speaking to the content of emails,” State Department spokeswoman Nicole Thompson told Breitbart News.

 

Here are some examples of (b)(3) redactions;

Naming the defense attaché in Malta

On October 16, 2011, recent U.S. Ambassador to Malta Douglas Kmiec sent an email to Cheryl Mills with the subject line “TIME SENSITIVE AND CONFIDENTIAL – Malta Trip Backgrounder for the Secretary – Confidential.”

Kmiec wrote to Mills, “I know from current events that your life must be a whirlwind. I know that if there ever was someone who could tame the whirlwind, it would be you. Just read the news report of the Secretary’s stop in Malta next week. Thank you for arranging this. This letter and the accompanying clips I believe will help make the Secretary’s visit a highly successful and well received one.”

In the memo, Kmiec revealed the name of a top defense attaché in the country. That name was later classified by the State Department with three different classifications: 1.4 (D) to connote “Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources,” B1 to connote “Information specifically authorized by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy,” and “B3 CIA PERS/ORG.”

“The largest part of our US team in the embassy is the navy/coast guard/ ncis contingent that has established a Maritime training program with the AFM to good success. The defense attaché there now is new [REDACTED] beloved and hardworking – and to good effect, patrolling the waters and the ports for [illegible] traffickers and terror related figures,” Kmiec wrote.

Mills forwarded the memo directly to Clinton’s private email account at clintonemail.com with the note “Fyi background.”

Clinton replied to Mills and CC’ed Huma Abedin with the confidential information, writing, “I need enough time there to meet. Hague is there today and doing all the right meetings. So, I’m copying Huma to reinforce my desire to squeeze more out of a too quick trip.”

When he sent the memo to Mills, Douglas Kmiec had been out of his Ambassador to Malta job for several months. Kmiec was a big supporter of President Obama. He garnered criticism in a 2011 inspector general report for ignoring directives from Washington and for spending too much time writing articles about religion.

Naming the guest in her office 

On December 15, 2011, Clinton’s office manager Claire Coleman sent out Clinton’s daily schedule to Clinton’s private email account and to Abedin and others.

The schedule included a five-minute Presidential Daily Briefing in the Secretary’s office between 8:35 AM and 8:40 AM.

“Note: Official Photo following w/ [Redacted]” the schedule read, blanking out the name of the person who Clinton was taking a photo with. That redaction was marked “B3 CIA PERS/ORG” in addition to other redactions.

Clinton’s public schedule released for that day begins at 9 AM, after the classified photo op.

Petraeus’ chief of staff

On March 14, 2012, a redacted name sent Cheryl Mills an email with the subject line “URGENT — From Dave Petraeus’s Chief of Staff…”

The sender’s name was marked with a “B3” redaction to connote violation of the CIA statute.

“Dear Cheryl,” the email began, followed by a vast section of redacted material. Those paragraphs were marked with several classifications including “B3 CIA PERS/ORG.”

The email’s closing paragraphs were also marked with B3 redactions.

“Does all of that sound ok to you?” the message continued. “If so, may I please ask you to get word around immediately [B3 Redaction] only in those circumstances where he deems that to be appropriate and the best way forward? Thanks much and cheers, [B3 Redaction].”

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

On September 15, 2012, a B3 redacted name sent an email to Jake Sullivan numerous redacted names with a redacted subject line, most of text redacted, “Per the discussion at Deputies, here are the revised TPs for HPSCI [The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence].”

The email was later forwarded to Clinton, who told an aide, “PLs print.”

“Iran Insights”

On September 2, 2009, Jackie Newmyer of Long Term Strategy Group in Cambridge, Massachusetts sent an email directly to Clinton’s private account with the subject line “Iran Insights From [Redacted]” that included the B3 redaction code:

Secretary Clinton,

Last week I traveled to Israel [REDACTED] in an Iran-related seminar and simulation exercise with the IDF general who is likely to become Israel’s next chief of military intelligence and his team and, separately, [REDACTED]. Yesterday, [REDACTED] Iran workshop in Washington involving DoD and think tank experts. Despite the fact that the meetings were with defense [REDACTED] personnel, there was universal sentiment that a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be counterproductive, on the one hand, and that incremental measures would be perceived by Iran as an indication of weakness, on the other.

The email included sensitive information including the following:

If Iran acquires a nuclear capability, no single American/allied countermeasure will be adequate. Something like the “flexible response” posture from the Cold War will be required, necessitating a range of actions from enhancing the US deterrent presence — nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles in the Arabian Sea — to bolstering regional actors’ defenses.

Israeli leaders should be able to contain the damage to the Israeli population’s morale from an Iranian bomb, but this will require careful management of public statements. There is a tension between building up support for action against the Iranian nuclear program now and delivering the kind of reassurance that will be necessary once the capability has been acquired.

Clinton replied that she would like to discuss the matter with Jackie.

Jackie replied:

I will be in Washington for a day-long meeting on Thursday this week [B3 REDACTED] and my travel plans are flexible, so I could meet you any time on Wednesday afternoon, after 5 pm on Thursday, or any time on Friday morning. If those times do not work, I would be happy to come down at your convenience.

Clinton and Jake Sullivan then set up a meeting with Jackie.

Naming someone at the ‘Pre-Brief’

On November 11, 2011, Clinton’s special assistant Lona J. Valmoro sent an email directly to Clinton’s private email address with the subject line “Pre-Brief.”

Valmoro wrote:

“MS — Kurt said that he has no reservations about Toria joining the pre-brief so I will confirm.

The manifest for the meeting will be:

Kurt Campbell

Jake Sullivan

Evan Mederios, NSS

Admiral Willard

Kin Moy

Toria Nuland

[REDACTED] per Kurt’s request”

That last name on the list was redacted with “B6” and also “B3 CIA PERS/ORG” classifications.

‘See Traffic’

On March 14, 2012, Mills sent an email to then-U.S. Ambassador to Algeria Henry Ensher with the subject line “Connecting.”

“I hope your visit to DC is going well,” Mills said before writing a chunk of text that is redacted with 1.4 (D), B1, and also “B3 CIA PERS/ORG” redactions.

Mills’ redacted text clearly included a name because she then wrote, “B/f I could respond w/our protocol he advised that the matter had been resolved. Can you advise as to what accommodation was worked out?”

Ensher replied, “Sorry. Had not seen this until en route back to post. Accommodation was to have elizabeth go to a dinner meeting, but not the next day session with senior counterpart. Bare objectives of visit were achieved but we blew an opportunity to make the larger point about civ control of mil, which is critical in dealing with algerian leaders.”

Ensher’s next paragraph is redacted with 1.4 (D), B1, and also the “B3 CIA PERS/ORG” redactions.

“Good work on com conf. Thx,” Ensher concluded.

After sending another email to Ensher, Mills forwarded the chain to Clinton’s private email account and said “See traffic.”

The departing diplomat

On December 12, 2011, Mills sent an email to Clinton’s private email account with the subject line “FW: Thank you for your time today.”

“[REDACTED] last day is Thursday,” Mills wrote, adding that “Lona” would arrange a photograph for the man with Clinton and his daughter and asking Clinton for feedback on the employee. The redacted portion had a B6 and a “B3 CIA PERS/ORG” redaction.

“He did a good job,” Clinton replied.

The Taliban

On March 25, 2012, Jake Sullivan forwarded to Clinton’s private email address a chain involving a meeting involving Pakistan and the Taliban that had a “B3 CIA PERS/ORG” redaction in it. The subject line was “Fw: MG-Z in Dushanbe.”

Hill testimony

On January 23, 2013, Mills forwarded to Clinton’s private email address a transcript of Clinton’s testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with the subject line “Fw: Testimony as Prepared for Delivery to SFRC & HFAC.”

The chain included an email that a person with a redacted name sent to Mills saying, “You know, she’s pretty damned good.”

The chain also included an email that Mills sent with the transcript to various people including White House adviser Ben Rhodes and various individuals with redacted names, including two people whose names are blotted out with “B3 CIA PERS/ORG” redactions.

CC’s

On July 25, 2010, Jake Sullivan forwarded Clinton a long email chain with the subject line “Fw: Digest from NyTimes and Guardian [Full E-Mail List].”

The highly redacted email chain was at one point forwarded to “[Full E-Mail List]” and includes on multiple occasions an individual whose name is blotted out with a “B3 CIA PERS/ORG” redaction.

June 6, D-Day Normandy Invasion Anniversary

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Defense: On June 6, 1944, nearly 160,000 Allied troops landed along a heavily fortified, 50-mile stretch of French coastline in the historic operation known as D-Day. More than 9,000 Allied soldiers were killed or wounded on the beaches of Normandy, but by day’s end, the Allies had gained a foothold to begin liberating Europe.

U.S. Marines Tour Hallowed Ground in France

More than 70 enlisted Marines with Headquarters and Service Company, Headquarters Marine Corps, Henderson Hall, and Marine Barracks Washington, D.C., toured U.S. military historical sites in advance of the 72nd anniversary of D-Day. Story

D-Day by the Numbers

Allied Troops: 160,000; Allied Aircraft: 113,000; Naval Vessels: 5,000

Members of a U.S. landing party lend helping hands to other service members whose landing craft was sunk by enemy action off the coast of Normandy.

5 Things You May Not Know About D-Day

D-Day is one of the most famous dates in history, but there are a lot of things you may not know about the WWII invasion. Story

 
Some of their stories, click here.
As a reminder, note the American cemeteries in Europe.
 France
 England
 Omaha Beach
 Luxembourg

‘Extremist Islamic Movement’ in Latin America

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US military eyes ‘extremist Islamic movement’ in Latin America

TheHill: The top U.S. military commander in Latin America said he and his regional counterparts are growing more concerned about radical Islamic extremists using the region as a pathway into the U.S.

“Radicalization is occurring,” said Adm. Kurt Tidd, commander of U.S. Southern Command, at a roundtable with reporters on Wednesday.

“We just have to recognize that this theater is a very attractive target and is an attractive pathway that we have to pay attention to,” he said.

Tidd, who became Southcom commander in January, said the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria has attracted between 100 and 150 recruits from Latin America, and a “small number” have attempted to return to the region.

“Or — and the one that I find much more worrisome — if they can’t get there, they’ve been told to engage in lone-wolf attacks where they’re located,” he said. “Those are the ones that have most of our regional security partners concerned because they’re so difficult to detect.

“It’s the extremist Islamist movement, and that very corrosive engagement that you’re seeing on the internet that they’ve demonstrated an effectiveness in,” he added.

He also said there is some movement of migrants from the Middle East to Latin America.

“I think we are beginning to see people coming into this hemisphere who have very, very questionable backgrounds, and our law enforcement agencies are paying close attention to that,” he added.

Tidd said leaders acknowledged at a regional security conference in January that Islamic radicalization is a problem.

“All of the countries recognize that this is something that — in the past they would say, ‘This is not a problem in my country,’ ” he said.

He said terrorists are attracted to illicit smuggling networks in Latin America.

But, he said, the U.S. and its partners should focus on the networks rather than exactly what they are smuggling, such as animals, drugs, weapons and people.

“It’s the ability that these networks have to pretty much be able to move anything that I think should give us all concern,” he said.

“If we focus on the networks we may have a better chance of catching things moving through,” he said.

*******

   

Radical Islam in Latin America and the Caribbean: Implications for U.S. National Security

by: Dr. R. Evan Ellis, PhD1

An estimated 1.5 million Muslims live among Latin America and the Caribbean’s approximately 600 million inhabitants, with approximately 2/3 of them concentrated in Argentina and Brazil.16 Although sometimes mistakenly called “turcos” (turks) the region’s Muslims are a diverse subset of persons who immigrated from Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, and other Middle Eastern countries from the beginning of the 20th Century and before.

This ethnic group, both muslim and non-muslim, is well-established, including some of the most politically and economically successful persons in the region. Indeed eight Latin American and Caribbean heads of state have been of Arabic origin: Antonio Saca (President of El Salvador from 2004 to 2009), Jamil Mahuad (President of Ecuador from August 1998 to January 2000), Carlos Flores (President of Honduras from 1998 to 2002), Carlos Menem (President of Argentina from 1989 to 1999), Abdalá Bucaram (President of Ecuador from August 1996 to February 1997), Jacobo Majluta (President of the Dominican Republic from July to August 1982), Julio Turbay (President of Colombia 1978 to 1982), and Julio Salem (leader of Ecuador May 1944).17

Other prominent citizens of Middle Eastern ancestry in the region include Mexican billionaire Carlos Slim, the actress Salma Hayek, and the pop music star Shakira.

To date, Iran has been the principal, but not the only Middle Eastern state pursuing interests in the region. Other state actors from the region have also played a modest role in the region in the past; Libya, prior to the fall of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, was a significant partner for Bolivia.18 There is no reason why other Middle Eastern states could not also expand their profile in the region, including Syria, whose current regime has a long working relationship with Hezbollah, 19 currently the most powerful Islamic radical group in Latin America.

Iran’s agenda in the region in recent years has generally focused on using sympathetic regimes such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Suriname to escape international isolation and circumvent international sanctions, develop missiles and perhaps weapons of mass destruction, and to gain influence within Muslim groups and communities so as to potentially use them for actions against the United States, Jewish, or other Western interests if Iran’s regime perceives itself as gravely threatened in the future.20

While Iran seeks to mobilize and influence non-state Islamic actors in the region such as Hezbollah for its own purposes, the interests of such groups and the potential challenges they pose to hemispheric security are not limited solely to Iran’s agenda.

The combined challenges of both state and other radical Islamic actors in Latin America and the Caribbean may be grouped into three categories:

• Generation of resources for islamic radicals fighting in other parts of the world;

• Formation of logistics networks for and launching attacks on targets in the Western Hemisphere;

and

• Collaboration between radical Islamic actors and Latin American allies in evading international controls and developing weapons. The full report here.

The Silent Heroes in Iraq, Saving the Girls

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(CNN)The bidding opens at $9,000. For sale? A Yazidi girl.

She is said to be beautiful, hardworking, and a virgin. She’s also just 11 years old.
 
This advertisement — a screengrab from an online marketplace used by ISIS fighters to barter for sex slaves — is one of many Abdullah Shrem keeps in his phone.
Each offers vital clues — photographs, locations — that he hopes will help him save Yazidi girls and young women like this girl from the militants holding them captive.

Shrem was a successful businessman with trade connections to Aleppo in Syria when ISIS came and kidnapped more than 50 members of his family from Iraq’s Sinjar province, a handful of the thousands of Yazidis seized there in 2014.

Tens of thousands of Yazidis fled their homes and clambered up Mount Sinjar in an attempt to escape the fighters; hundreds were massacred, while thousands of women and girls were abducted and sold into slavery.

Sold into sex slavery

Desperate — and angered at what he saw as a lack of support from the international community — he began plotting to save them himself, recruiting cigarette smugglers used to sneaking illicit produce in and out of ISIS territory to help his efforts.

“No government or experts trained us,” he explains when we meet in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq. “We learned by just doing it, over the last year and a half, we gained the experience.”
 The Shariya camp opened six months ago and now 4,000 tents line the dusty ground, providing shelter to thousands of refugees.

 Shariya camp with 4000 tents
 
So far, he says, his network has freed 240 Yazidis; it hasn’t been easy, or cheap — he’s almost broke, having spent his savings paying smuggling fees.
For those who venture into ISIS territory, the stakes are even higher — a number of the smugglers have been captured and executed by ISIS while trying to track down Yazidi slaves.
But Shrem insists the risks are worth it: “Whenever I save someone, it gives me strength and it gives me faith to keep going until I have been able to save them all.”
In some cases, the smugglers follow clues in the adverts or other tidbits of information they’re able to gather to find the Yazidis. In others, the hostages themselves reach out and plead for help, offering key details as to their location; a province or town they’ve overheard mentioned, or a local landmark they’ve been able to spot.
Once they manage to make contact, the prisoners are told when and where to go to meet the smugglers who wait for them in a nearby car. Depending on the circumstances of the rescue, it can take days or even weeks to get safely out of ISIS territory, switching from vehicle to vehicle, and waiting in safe houses.

Children as bomb-makers

Dileen (not her real name) is one of those rescued by Shrem and his team of smugglers.
She was separated from her husband when ISIS militants overran Sinjar province. The last time she saw him he was being marched away, hands up, with the other men from their village.
She and her children were taken to Mosul with the women and girls. “They separated the ones who were really pretty, and made us remove our headscarves to see the prettiest ones,” she says.

 
 
They were moved from place to place within ISIS territory: Mosul, Tal Afar, Raqqa, and finally to Tishrin where, she says, she was sold to an ISIS fighter, who raped her repeatedly.
“They forced me, and they threatened my children,” she says, recalling the five months she spent trapped in his home.
ISIS claims the Quran justifies taking non-Muslim women and girls captive, and permits their rape — a claim vociferously denied by Islamic scholars.
While Dileen was used as a sex slave, her daughter Aisha (not her real name), who is just seven years old, was forced to work late into the night, in the basement of their apartment building, assembling IEDs for ISIS.
“I used to make bombs,” says Aisha, quietly, playing with her hair. “There was a girl my age and her mother. They threatened to kill [the girl] if I wouldn’t go and work with them,” she told CNN.
“They would dress us in all black and there was a yellow material and sugar and a powder, and we would weigh them on a scale and then we would heat them and pack the artillery.”
An ISIS militant, she says, would then add the detonation wires.

Escapees ‘can’t forget’

The Yazidis have long suffered persecution, with many Muslims referring to them as devil worshipers. The ISIS storming of Sinjar created a humanitarian crisis as some fled into the mountains and were trapped without food or water.
Dileen was terrified Aisha would be blown up, or that — if the family was still being held captive by her next birthday — she too would be sold as a sex slave. So when the ISIS fighter she now belonged to left to go on a military operation, she spotted a chance to escape. She called Shrem and asked him to help them flee.
“We got to a phone with the help of another woman; we got in touch with Abdullah.”

  
Shrem’s phone number — memorized by his relatives before their phones were confiscated by ISIS — has been passed around among captured Yazidis, who know he will help them if he can.
“I begged him to hurry up and get us before my daughter turned eight, because they would take her.”
Shrem told her to meet someone from his network at a nearby mosque the following day, then spirited her and her children out of ISIS territory.

A year on from their rescue, Dileen — now living in a refugee camp in Iraqi Kurdistan — says she is still haunted by what they went through: “I can’t forget what happened.”
Her husband is still missing, feared dead, but Dileen insists that “for my children, I have to survive.”

Smuggling Network, Terror Hotbeds, Southern Border

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Smuggling network guided illegals from Middle East terror hotbeds to U.S. border

WashingtonTimes: A smuggling network has managed to sneak illegal immigrants from Middle East terrorism hotbeds straight to the doorstep of the U.S., including helping one Afghan man authorities say was part of an attack plot in North America.

Immigration officials have identified at least a dozen Middle Eastern men smuggled into the Western Hemisphere by a Brazilian-based network that connected them with Mexicans who guided them up to the U.S. border, according to internal government documents reviewed by The Washington Times.

Those smuggled included Palestinians, Pakistanis and the Afghan man who Homeland Security officials said had family ties to the Taliban and was “involved in a plot to conduct an attack in the U.S. and/or Canada.” He is in custody but the Times is withholding his name at the request of law enforcement to protect ongoing investigations.

Some of the men handled by the smuggling network were nabbed before they got to the U.S., but others actually made it into the country, including the Afghan man who was part of a group of six from so-called “special interest countries.”

The group, guided by two Mexicans employed by the smuggling network, crawled under the border fence in Arizona late last year and made it about 15 miles north before being detected by border surveillance, according to the documents, which were obtained by Rep. Duncan Hunter, California Republican.

Law enforcement asked The Times to withhold the name of the smuggling network.

It’s unclear whether the network succeeded in sneaking other “special interest” illegal immigrants by border officials, but the documents obtained by Mr. Hunter confirm fears of a pipeline that can get would-be illegal immigrants from terrorist hotbeds to the threshold of the U.S.

Just as troubling, the Border Patrol didn’t immediately spot the Afghan man’s terrorist ties because the database agents first checked didn’t list him. It wasn’t until they also checked an FBI database that they learned he may be a danger, the documents say.

“It’s disturbing, in so many ways,” said Joe Kasper, Mr. Hunter’s chief of staff. “The interdiction of this group validates once again that the southern border is wide open to more than people looking to enter the U.S. illegally strictly for purposes of looking for work, as the administration wants us to believe. What’s worse, federal databases weren’t even synched and Border Patrol had no idea who they were arresting and the group was not considered a problem because none of them were considered a priority under the president’s enforcement protocol. That’s a major problem on its own, and it calls for DHS to figure out the problem — and fast.”

Mr. Hunter wrote a letter to to Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson this week demanding answers about the breakdowns in the process.

Both U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which is the chief agency charged with sniffing out smuggling networks, and Customs and Border Protection, which oversees the Border Patrol and which initially failed to sniff out the terrorist connections, declined to comment. Homeland Security, which oversees both agencies, didn’t provide an answer either.

The group of six men nabbed after they already got into the U.S. — the Afghan and five men identified as Pakistanis — all made asylum claims when they were eventually caught by the Border Patrol. Mr. Hunter said his understanding is that the five men from Pakistan were released based on those claims, and have disappeared.

The government documents reviewed by The Times didn’t say how much the smugglers charged, but did detail some of their operation.

Would-be illegal immigrants were first identified by a contact in the Middle East, who reported them to the smuggling network in Brazil. That network then arranged their travel up South America and through Central America, where some of them were nabbed by U.S. allies.

In the case of the Afghan man with terrorist ties, he was smuggled from Brazil through Peru, then Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala and finally Mexico.

He was caught near a ranch 15 miles into the U.S., after his group’s movements were detected by one of the Border Patrol’s mobile detection trucks. He told agents his group had crawled under the border fence near Nogales.

In the documents obtained by Mr. Hunter, Homeland Security officials said they considered the case a victory because it showed how they can use apprehensions on the southwest border to trace smuggling networks back to their source.

But the documents had worrying signs as well. When agents first ran the man through the Terrorist Screening Data Base, he didn’t show up as a danger. Indeed, a November report from KNXV-TV in Arizona said authorities said “records checks revealed no derogatory information about the individuals.”

That turns out not to be true, according to the documents. The Afghan man was listed in the FBI’s Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) database as having suspect relations.

Mr. Hunter told Mr. Johnson the discrepancy between the databases was troubling.

The government documents also said some of the special interest aliens caught at the border were previously identified by authorities in other Latin American countries — but had different sets of biometric identifiers associated with them. That raised questions of whether those countries are sharing accurate information with the U.S.

Networks capable of smuggling potential terrorists has long been a concern, but the Obama administration had tamped down those worries, arguing that the southwest border wasn’t a likely route for operatives.

Still, evidence has mounted over the last couple of years, including a smuggling ring that snuck four Turkish men with ties to a U.S.-designated terrorist group into the U.S. in 2014. they paid $8,000 apiece to be smuggled from Istanbul through Paris to Mexico City, where they were stashed in safe houses before being smuggled to the border.

At the time, Mr. Johnson said the men were actually part of a group that was fighting against the Islamic State, and questioned whether they should have even been designated as part of a terrorist group.

But behind the scenes Mr. Johnson’s agents were already at work trying to roll up smuggling rings under an action dubbed Operation Citadel.

Lev Kubiak, assistant director at ICE Homeland Security Investigations’ international operations branch, testified to Congress earlier this year that Operation Citadel resulted in 210 criminal arrests in 2015. One part of the effort, known as Operation Lucero, dismantled 14 human smuggling routes, including some operations designed to move people from the Eastern Hemisphere to Latin America and then into the U.S., he said.

Next up is the U.S. State Department Report by Country on Terrorism

Country Reports on Terrorism 2015

Chapters –Chapter 1. Strategic Assessment
–Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview
–Chapter 2. Country Reports: East Asia and Pacific Overview
–Chapter 2. Country Reports: Europe Overview
–Chapter 2. Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview
–Chapter 2. Country Reports: South and Central Asia Overview
–Chapter 2. Country Reports: Western Hemisphere Overview
–Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview
–Chapter 4: The Global Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism
–Chapter 5: Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report)
–Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations
–Chapter 7. Legislative Requirements and Key Terms

Annexes

–National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Annex of Statistical Information [Get Acrobat Reader PDF version   ]
–Terrorism Deaths, Injuries and Kidnappings of Private U.S. Citizens Overseas in 2015

Full Report

–Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 (PDF)