FBI Releases Hillary Server Investigation Documents

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Signed on January 22, of 2009, Hillary declared by signature her compliance to classified material.

Hillary Non Disclosure This is the actual document with her signature.

FBI Releases Documents in Hillary Clinton E-Mail Investigation

Today the FBI is releasing a summary of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s July 2, 2016 interview with the FBI concerning allegations that classified information was improperly stored or transmitted on a personal e-mail server she used during her tenure. We also are releasing a factual summary of the FBI’s investigation into this matter. We are making these materials available to the public in the interest of transparency and in response to numerous Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. Appropriate redactions have been made for classified information or other material exempt from disclosure under FOIA.

FBI Background Investigation Hillary servers

FBI 302 Report on Hillary Interview

As a note, the FBI 302 report is shorter and frankly it tells us that Hillary told the FBI she cant remember sh*t. Hillary left all judgment to handling government material and security classifications to ‘her’ State Department professionals. The real background investigation report defines the best part of the whole scandal, it is 47 pages and quite chilling. Oh…there were several servers and 13 mobile devices. Her covert intelligence aide Sidney Blumenthal did receive at least 24 email exchanges with classified material. Redactions abound and avoiding FOIA was the underlying objective.

2 Generals Have a Lot to Say About Obama’s ISIS Strategy

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Former U.S. Commanders Take Increasingly Dim View of War on ISIS

As conflict enters its third year, endgame still elusive

Time: It’s a most peculiar war: rarely has the U.S. been killing so many while risking so few. The U.S. is beating ISIS handily, judging by Vietnam’s body-count metric. The total number of ISIS battlefield deaths claimed by U.S. officials has jumped, from 6,000 in January 2015 to 45,000 last month—a bloodbath for an enemy force estimated to number about 30,000. Three U.S. troops have died. That’s an eye-watering U.S.-to-ISIS “kill ratio” of 15,000-to-1. “We’ve got good momentum going,” General Joseph Votel, chief of U.S. Central Command, who is overseeing the war, said Tuesday. “We are really into the heart of the caliphate.”

Syrian Peshmerga fighters

Yunus Keles / Anadolu Agency / Getty ImagesSyrian Peshmerga fighters outside Mosul Aug. 18, preparing for an offensive to retake Iraq’s second-largest city from ISIS.

But some of his predecessors disagree. James Mattis, a retired Marine general who commanded Central Command from 2010 to 2013, says the war on ISIS is “unguided by a sustained policy or sound strategy [and is] replete with half-measures.” Anthony Zinni, a retired Marine four-star who held the same post from 1997 to 2000, says he doesn’t think he could do so today. “I don’t want to be part of a strategy that in my heart of hearts I know is going to fail,” he says. “It’s a bad strategy, it’s the wrong strategy, and maybe I would tell the President that he would be better served to find somebody who believes in it, whoever that idiot may be.”

Institute for the Study of War

Day after day, American warplanes, sometimes joined by allies, have been attacking individual ISIS targets, down to backhoes and foxholes. ISIS has lost 40% of its Iraqi territory, the Pentagon says, and 5% in Syria. It doesn’t seem to have lost any of the terrain it has staked out on the internet. That’s slow progress by a 27-state military alliance against a two-year-old rump state.

The U.S.-led war against the Islamic State is entering its third year (eclipsing the time the U.S. spent fighting World War I). In part, that’s because it’s a small-bore campaign: the U.S. is spending $4 billion a year, equal to a third the cost of a single aircraft carrier (planes not included). “Employing an anemic application of force relative to previous air campaigns has yielded the Islamic State time to export their message, garner followers, and spread their message,” says David Deptula, a retired Air Force lieutenant general who planned the 1991 bombing campaign that all-but-drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. “A comprehensive strategy to rapidly decompose the Islamic State is still lacking.”

Department of Defense

On the ground—the only way to retake territory—the hapless Iraqi army, Kurdish forces, and a motley medley of Syrian rebels are spear-heading the fight. U.S. troops alongside them (about 5,000 in Iraq, and 300 in Syria), serve primarily as advisers, in another unfortunate echo of Vietnam. ISIS continues to hold on to its key centers of gravity: its self-declared capital in the Syrian city of Raqqa, and Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, 300 miles away. “I’ve talked to some U.S. generals who are really frustrated—they could be in Raqqa in a week,” Zinni says. The U.S. is “losing credibility and they’re actually encouraging the enemy because they’re able to hold the ground for years now.”

But bombs or ground troops, by themselves, can’t cure ISIS or whatever radical group springs up to replace it. “Proposals to escalate or accelerate the campaign in Iraq and Syria in order to hasten the Islamic State group’s defeat would accomplish a lot less than commonly supposed,” says Stephen Biddle, a military analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations who advised then-general David Petraeus on Iraq from 2007 to 2009. “The problem isn’t taking Mosul or Raqqa—it’s what would come afterward. Stabilization is unlikely without an investment vastly larger than most Americans will support.” The U.S. has spent $3 trillion and nearly 7,000 lives trying to bring stability to Afghanistan and Iraq, with little to show for it. (For his part, Petraeus, who ran Central Command from 2008 to 2010, only acknowledges that “we’re waging war in a way that is somewhat unique.”)

ISIS’s tenacity is the oxygen that gives life to would-be jihadists around the globe, pumping violence into places like Britain, France, Germany and the U.S. The significance of Tuesday’s killing of ISIS strategist Abu Muhammad Adnani, apparently in a U.S. drone strike, marks a clear blow to the jihadists. But there are others, waiting in the wings, eager to replace him, U.S. officials say.

Current U.S. commanders say their progress is limited by the lack of local ground forces to retake territory from ISIS. They estimated from the start that the fight could take at least three years, winning credit for candor that was MIA when the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. U.S. officials say the anti-ISIS forces are making slow, but steady, gains, and an offensive to retake Mosul may begin by year’s end (originally, the Pentagon had penciled in April 2015 for the effort to retake northern Iraq’s largest city).

Part of the challenge is the Gordian knot that the Iraq-Syrian theater has become. ISIS sprang from the now-five-year-old Syrian civil war, which has killed 400,000 and displaced 10 million. Nearly half have fled the country, fomenting unrest across Europe. Iran and Russian back the government of Syrian President Bashar Assad—a fight the U.S. has resolutely refused to enter (even after Assad, despite a warning of a “red line” by President Obama, used chemical weapons on his own people in 2013). “At the end of the day, our current U.S. policy in the region has failed expensively and shredded our credibility,” says Barry McCaffrey, a retired Army general says retired Army general Barry McCaffrey, who led an Army division into Iraq in 1991’s Gulf War.

With more than a dozen air forces overhead, and about 1,000 armed factions on the ground, the risk of crossfires and mistaken shoot downs is ever present. Don’t think that doesn’t pre-occupy U.S. military planners. Given the death-by-fire of Jordanian pilot Moaz al-Kasasbeh at ISIS hands last year after his F-16 crash-landed inside the self-declared caliphate, the U.S. is going to great lengths to keep its ISIS-fighting troops safe. U.S. domestic political pressure to smash ISIS would surge following any such capture and torture of a U.S. pilot or commando. That’s why robust combat-search and rescue teams are on alert whenever U.S. warplanes fly in harm’s way, and why the U.S. military is training its forces to elude capture and escape from “a typical remote Iraqi/Syrian village.”

Department of Defense

The U.S. has big goals for a small-scale war. Washington sees its mission as destroying ISIS, helping negotiate an end to the Syrian civil war, and keeping the lid on the historic rivalry between Islam’s Sunni and Shiite branches. Iran and Russia back Syria’s Assad. Saudi Arabia and Turkey want him gone. But Turkey is a problematic NATO ally that views Kurdish separatists, a key U.S. ally in the ISIS fight, as a bigger threat than ISIS. The U.S. is backing four major rebel groups with air strikes: the Iraqi army, moderate Syrian rebels, and separate Kurdish forces in Iraq and Syria. But crushing ISIS helps Assad, fueling the civil war, and bolstering Kurdish fighters angers Turkey, which believes some are allied with a Turkish Kurdish group responsible for terror attacks inside that country.

All this, rightly or wrongly, has tied U.S. hands. “There is no political will in the White House to even listen to serious recommendations from military commands,” says Derek Harvey, a retired Army military-intelligence colonel who spent much of his career in Iraq. “The original strategy explained by the President was barely adequate and even that was not resourced or executed well.” While Obama’s go-slow approach loses its lease in January, neither Hillary Clinton nor Donald Trump has detailed a replacement. “First and foremost are we going to be decisive and have some balls, or just continue to try to manage conflict to unacceptable ends,” Harvey adds. “If not the former, then we should not play in the sandbox.”

As the long-awaited showdown to retake Mosul looms, cracks are appearing in the allied front. Iraq’s parliament voted to oust Defense Minister Khaled al-Obeidi on corruption charges Aug 25. In recent days, it has become clear that the Qayara air base south of Mosul that is supposed to be a major launching pad for the assault was almost completed destroyed by retreating ISIS fighters in July. And Kurdish forces—long lauded as the best fighters in the region—are hungry. “The Peshmerga are not getting enough calories to keep them in the field,” Army Lt. Gen. Sean MacFarland said Aug. 10 as he wrapped up his 11 months in charge of the ISIS fight. “We’re very interested in making sure that they have enough food just to carry on the fight.” Such news could well delay the Mosul fight into 2017.

“Doing nothing would be far preferable to this mess,” says Daniel Bolger, a retired Army three-star who commanded troops in both Afghanistan and Iraq before retiring in 2013. He plucks a quote from the military history he teaches at North Carolina State University, when asked about current U.S. strategy. It comes from a French general after he witnessed the doomed charge of the British Light Brigade against the Russians in the Crimean War in 1854: “It is magnificent, but it is not war,” Pierre Bosquet said. “It is madness.”

****

Then it seems, the matter of Islamic State in Libya is a month by month gig.

Obama extends Libya bombing mission against ISIS, officials say

President Obama has extended the U.S. military’s combat mission in Libya for another month at the request of senior military leaders, two defense officials with knowledge of the order told Fox News.

The decision keeps two U.S. Navy warships off the coast of Libya to continue striking ISIS and assist Libyan ground forces fighting the terror group in the coastal city of Sirte.

One of the U.S. warships had been scheduled to go to the Persian Gulf in September to begin airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria and keep an eye on Iran, a week after four provocations between Iranian gunboats and U.S. Navy ships — one of which resulted in warning shots being fired by a U.S. warship. The other, a U.S. Navy destroyer, was supposed to head to the Black Sea near Russia next month. But both plans will be put on hold, according to one defense official.

USS Wasp, a large amphibious assault ship loaded with over 1,000 Marines as well as Harrier jets and Cobra attack helicopters, will remain off the coast of Libya – as will her escort ship, USS Carney, a guided-missile destroyer.

“The destroyer is close enough to be seen from shore,” one defense official said.

U.S. Marine Corps jets and attack helicopters from USS Wasp have conducted 92 airstrikes against ISIS in Libya as of Monday, according to statistics provided from the U.S. military’s Africa Command.

Marine Harrier jets have conducted 124 missions over Libya against ISIS since airstrikes began on Aug. 1. Marine Cobra attack helicopters have flown 31 missions as of Tuesday, according to statistics provided by one defense official who requested anonymity.

Another defense official told Fox News he expected U.S. airstrikes to be ending soon because ground forces loyal to the U.N.-backed government in Tripoli which the U.S. military is supporting is now in control of 90 percent of Sirte. The Libyan city is located roughly halfway between Tripoli and Benghazi on the Mediterranean coast.

Earlier this week, Libyan forces suffered heavy casualties while fighting ISIS, according to reports. According to the BBC, 34 Libyan soldiers were killed and 150 wounded in recent fighting.

Estimates about the ISIS presence in Libya vary. In June, CIA Director John Brennan said there were 5,000 to 8,000 fighters in Libya. Recently, U.S. military officials said only “hundreds” remained in the ISIS-stronghold of Sirte, but did not have estimates for the rest of the country.

Neither the White House nor the Pentagon has officially disclosed the extension for the two U.S. Navy warships and airstrikes against ISIS there. The president’s initial authorization was for 30 days.

$1.7 Billion to Iran to be Spent this Way?

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Iran ‘is running covert war in Syria costing BILLIONS from top secret spymaster HQ near Damascus airport’, with 60000 fighters

Iran is shoring up the Syrian regime from a secret HQ in Damascus nicknamed ‘the Glasshouse’ – and commanding a huge covert army in support of Assad, according to leaked intelligence passed by activists to MailOnline.
The National Council of Resistance of Iran ( NCRI ) claims that the theocratic state’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has spent billions in hardware for its ally Bashar al-Assad in the last five years  – and runs operations on the ground from a five-floor monolith near Damascus airport.
The Iranian HQ, which plays a pivotal role in supporting Assad’s regime alongside Russia, contains intelligence and counterintelligence operations, and has vaults packed with millions of dollars in cash flown in from Tehran, claims the NCRI.
The allegations are contained in a dossier of reports apparently leaked by senior sources inside Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and collated by the dissident activists who oppose the Iranian regime.
The dossier – which was described as ‘credible’ by intelligence experts – makes the bold claims that Iran controls the biggest fighting force in Syria; has military bases throughout the splintered state; and has amassed a war-chest far greater than feared in support of Bashar Assad.

Much more to this story found here.

Six Key Unanswered Questions About the $1.7 Billion Ransom Payment to Iran

Over the past several weeks, the Obama administration has dodged questions, invented excuses, and misled the public to spin the apparent $1.7 billion ransom payment to Iran. So far this has left us with more questions than answers, particularly as it relates to the $1.3 billion “interest” payment.

As Speaker Ryan said earlier this month, “The president owes the American people a full accounting of his actions and the dangerous precedent he has set.”

Here are six key questions the president still needs to answer:

1. Why was the $1.3 billion transferred through an unknown central bank while the $400 million was paid in cash?

2. Why were these payments made separately?

3. Why wasn’t the $400 million paid through the central bank?

4. Was the $1.3 billion wired or paid in cash?

5. Was there a license issued to the unnamed central bank to shield it from sanctions under the Iran Transactions and Sanctions Regulations?

6. Is there a formal settlement agreement from the dispute at the Hague Tribunal?

The House will consider legislation later this month to address this dangerous ransom payment.

****

Khamenei: We will develop our defensive and offensive capabilities. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called the development of Iran’s “defensive and offensive capabilities” an “inalienable and clear right” during a meeting with officials from the Defense Ministry. Khamenei noted that developing weapons of mass destruction “including chemical and nuclear weapons” is prohibited but added that “besides these restrictions, there are no limitations on the development of our defensive and military capabilities. Advancing in these domains is our duty.”

President Hassan Rouhani called for enhanced defensive power through military and private sector collaboration; he also declared that Iran can purchase and sell weapons as it sees fit. The Defense Ministry unveiled an advanced short-range ballistic missile. The Iranian and British embassies reopened in Tehran and London after a four-year closure.

President Rouhani underlined the importance of integrating the military and private industry in order to advance the nation’s defensive capabilities. He also emphasized that Iran’s military doctrine is predicated on defense in an effort to allay concerns shared by some Arab states over the regime’s conventional capabilities. Rouhani reassured his domestic audiences that the nuclear deal will not limit Iran’s defense capacity, claiming: “We will sell and buy weapons whenever and wherever we deem it necessary… we will not wait for permission…or any resolution.” Defense Minister IRGC Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan stressed that Iran will not waver from its determination to strengthen its defense capabilities. The Defense Ministry, meanwhile, introduced the Fateh 313 precision-guided missile, which runs on solid fuel with a reported range of 500 kilometers.

National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission member Mohammad Esmail Kowsari criticized the Rouhani administration for failing to strengthen the economy, claiming: “Mr. Rouhani made promises to the people regarding the improvement of the economic situation, but today, not much has emerged.” The former senior IRGC commander stated, “Unfortunately, the current government does not tolerate fair criticism…”

British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond traveled to Iran on August 23 to reopen his country’s embassy in Tehran. Hammond and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif held a joint press conference to mark the resumption of Tehran-London ties. The British Foreign Secretary also met with President Rouhani and other senior Iranian officials. 

Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Undersecretary for Strategic Affairs Ali Hosseini Tash rejected a recent Associated Press report alleging that he signed a secret agreement with the IAEA, which purportedly allows Iran to use its own inspectors to monitor the Parchin military site. 

Yup, More Hillary Emails, Bigger Violations Surface

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Another day of CSS….Clinton Saturation Syndrome…

Judicial Watch: New Abedin Emails Reveal Top Clinton Foundation Executive Doug Band Sought Diplomatic Passport from Clinton State Department

Abedin responded to Band request: ‘Ok will figure it out’

Emails also reveal Bill Clinton/Doug Band Sought State Department Favors for Foundation supporters Paul Liveris, Chris Ruddy, and Lynn de Rothschild

(Washington, DC) – Judicial Watch today released 510 pages of new State Department documents, including a 2009 request by Clinton Foundation executive Doug Band for diplomatic passports for himself and an associate.  Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s aide Abedin responded to Band’s request positively, saying, “Ok will figure it out.”  The emails show Hillary Clinton forwarding classified information to Abedin’s unsecured, non-state.gov account. The emails also show Bill Clinton sought a meeting with Mrs. Clinton for a major Clinton donor with State Department officials and Hillary Clinton herself pushed for a joint event with the Clinton Global Initiative.  Band also pushed for and obtained special help from Abedin for seven-figure Clinton Foundation donor Chris Ruddy, of Newsmax.com.

Although an exchange sent from Sidney Blumenthal to Hillary Clinton concerning the “disastrous nature of the Obama trip” and the U.S. being “totally out of the loop in Berlin – no ambassador” with the expectation that “Germans and Russians will now cut their own separate deals on energy, regional security, etc….” had previously published by the State Department, it was unknown until now that Clinton forwarded this exchange containing classified information that was redacted for security reasons to Abedin’s unsecure non-state.gov account

The new documents included 37 Hillary Clinton email exchanges not previously turned over to the State Department, bringing the known total to date of such emails uncovered by Judicial Watch to 228 of new Clinton emails (not part of the 55,000 pages of emails that Clinton turned over to the State Department).  These records further appear to contradict statements by Clinton that, “as far as she knew,” all of her government emails were turned over to the State Department.

The Band request for a special diplomatic passport for himself and his associates – an unidentified “JD” and apparently Justin Cooper, formerly a key member of Bill Clinton’s personal office and the Clinton Foundation who has been linked to registration documents for and the shutting down of the email server at the center of Mrs. Clinton’s State Department emails controversy.

 

The Band-Abedin exchange went as follows:

From: Doug Band

To: Huma Abedin

Sent: Jul 27, 2009 10:32 AM

Subject:

Need get me/ justy and jd dip passports

We had them years ago but they lapsed and we didn’t bother getting them

From: Huma Abedin [[email protected]]

Sent: Monday, July 27, 2009 10:38:39 PM

To: Doug Band

Subject: Re:

Ok will figure it out

The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations strictly limits the granting of diplomatic passports to members of the Foreign Service, their family members, or those working on U.S. government contracts. According to 22 CFR 51.3:

A diplomatic passport is issued to a Foreign Service officer or to a person having diplomatic status or comparable status because he or she is traveling abroad to carry out diplomatic duties on behalf of the U.S. Government. When authorized by the Department, spouses and family members of such persons may be issued diplomatic passports. When authorized by the Department, a diplomatic passport may be issued to a U.S. Government contractor if the contractor meets the eligibility requirements for a diplomatic passport and the diplomatic passport is necessary to complete his or her mission.

The newly released Abedin emails also contain additional instances of the Clinton State Department’s granting special favors to major contributors to the Clinton Foundation. A July 27, 2009, exchange of emails begins with Abedin advising Clinton scheduler Lona Valmoro that “wjc” (William Jefferson Clinton) wants special treatment for high-dollar Foundation donor and Dow Chemical’s CEO Andrew Liveris. Dow donated between $1 million and $5 million to the Clinton Foundation, making it one of the largest corporate donors in Foundation history.

From: Huma Abedin [email protected]

To: Valmoro, Lona J

Sent: Monday, Jul 27 06:02:01 2009

Subject:

Wjc wants to be sure hrc sees Andrew Liveris, ceo of dow tomorrow night. Apparently he is head of us china business council. Is he definitely going to be there?

From: Valmoro, Lona J [[email protected]

Sent: July 27, 2009 6:03:54 AM

To: Huma Abedin

Subject: Re:

I will check. He declined our invitation to dinner tonight at State.

From: Valmoro, Lona J

Sent: Monday, July 27, 2009 9:24:08 AM

To: Huma Abedin; Narain, Paul F [Clinton aide]

Subject: Re: CEO of dow

Paul, Andrew Leveris, CEO of Dow Chemical, is going to be at the dinner tomorrow night. We would like HRC to see him, perhaps they can do a brief pull aside upon arrival. Huma, would that work for you?

From: Huma Abedin [[email protected]]

Sent: Monday, July 27, 2009 9:24:55 AM

To: Valmoro, Lona J, Huma Abedin, Narain, Paul F

Subject: Re: CEO of dow

Yes pull aside on arrival

From: Narain, Paul F

Sent, Monday, July 27, 2009 7:56 PM

To: Valmoro, Lona, Abedin Huma

Subject: RE: CEO of dow

Lona, I have arranged this pull aside for on the arrival in the Hold Room across the hall from the ballroom, immediately prior to the Secretary’s entrance and remarks.

The Abedin emails include a mid-August 2009, email exchange in which Band urges Abedin to follow up on a request from Newsmax CEO Chris Ruddy to set up a meeting with then-Ambassador to Panama Barbara Stephenson on behalf of lobbyist Amb. Otto Reich, President Reagan’s ambassador to Venezuela who maintained high-level government positions during the tenure of both President George H.W. Bush and President George Bush.  In early September, Ruddy then was contacted by State Department Deputy Assistant for the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Roberta S. Jacobson, at the behest of Band and Abedin, in reference to Ruddy’s concerns about Wilson Lucom, whose estate was embroiled in a heated multi-million-dollar lawsuit.  Ruddy’s Newsmax Media Inc, made a contribution to the Clinton Foundation of between $1 million and $5 million. The emails show the responsible official was put in contact with Ruddy.

From: Christopher [Redacted]

To: Doug Band [Redacted]

Sent: Mon Aug 17 3:40:56 2009

Subject: Panama

Otto Reich is arriving in Panama tonite on the matter I discussed. He was hoping to meet with Barbara Stephenson or her Charge this week. He has not heard back from her. Any “air’ support you can give for this meeting would be helpful. Thanks! – Christopher Ruddy

From: Doug Band

To: Huma Abedin

Sent: Aug 18, 2009 10:37 PM

Subject: Fw: Panama

Would be good to do quickly.

Even a call

From: Huma Abedin

To: Doug Band

Sent: Wed Aug 19 4:51:35 2009

Subject: Re: Panama

Both of our point people are out on vacation. I can ask someone junior to deal with this?

From: Doug Band

Sent: Wednesday, August 19, 2009 5:20:13 PM

To: Huma Abedin

Subject: Re: Panama

Sure

From: Jacobson, Roberta S

Sent: Friday, September 04, 2009 7:32 AM

To: ruddy [Redacted]

Subject: Panama case

Mr. Ruddy: Your inquiry about the Lucom case has been passed to the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs here at State. I apologize for not getting you a response on our position last evening, but we will get back to you as soon as possible today. Many thanks. Roberta Jacobson.

From: Christopher Ruddy

To: dband

Sent: Fri Sep 04, 08:01:20 2009 7:32 AM

Subject: FW: Panama case

From: Doug Band

To: Huma Abedin

Sent: Fri Sep 04 08:18:43 2009

Subject: Fw: Panama case

From: Huma Abedin

Sent: Friday, September 04, 2009 8:37:21 AM

To: Doug Band

Subject: Re: Panama case

She’s the dep assistant secretary for the whole bureau.

The Panama desk guy is on leave so I asked that she at least reach out.

(Newsmax publishes a regular Judicial Watch column.)

The new Abedin emails also include an email exchange between Sidney Blumenthal and the then-Secretary of State in which Blumenthal proposes a Clinton Global Initiative meeting in Ireland. Hillary Clinton forwarded Blumenthal’s email to Abedin, Cheryl Mills, and Doug Band saying, “I think this is a good idea and see no conflict.” Band then responded that he and Bill Clinton think it is as “great idea.”

Again, Hillary Clinton’s involvement her ethics pledge to stay of out of Clinton Foundation and Clinton Global Initiative business.  Secretary of State-designate Hillary Clinton on January 5, 2009, in a letter to State Department Designated Agency Ethics Official James H. Thessin:

“For the duration of my appointment as Secretary if I am confirmed, I will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter involving specific parties in which The William J. Clinton Foundation (or the Clinton Global Initiative) is a party or represents a party….”

In an email exchange in late August 2009, billionaire businesswoman Lynn Forester de Rothschild intervened directly with then Hillary Clinton to set up a Parade magazine interview for journalist Les Gelb, assuring Clinton, “He said he would give you a veto over content and looked me in the eye and said, ‘she will like it.’” Abedin then instructed State Department aide Phillip Reines. Reines acquiesced responding, “Yes, we’re trying to find a date that works for Les, but he is a little, shall we say, picky.” Rothschild is a longtime Clinton Foundation supporter who in mid-May of this year held a $100,000-a-plate fundraiser for the presidential candidate.

Also in the documents is an August 2009 communication from Hillary Clinton to her aides Abedin and Lauren Jiloty asking for the phone numbers of Declan Kelly, Clinton’s former economic envoy to Northern Ireland who is co-founder and CEO of Teneo.

“The idea that the State Department would even consider a diplomatic passport for Clinton Foundation executive is beyond belief,” stated Judicial Watch President Tom Fitton.  “These emails show various violations of national security laws and ethics rules and further confirm that Hillary and Bill Clinton are personally implicated in the Clinton Foundation pay to play scandal.”

This is the eleventh set of records produced for Judicial Watch by the State Department from the non-state.gov email accounts of Huma Abedin.  The documents were produced under a court order in a May 5, 2015, Freedom of Information (FOIA) lawsuit against the State Department (Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Department of State (No. 1:15-cv-00684)) requiring the agency to produce “all emails of official State Department business received or sent by former Deputy Chief of Staff Huma Abedin from January 1, 2009 through February 1, 2013, using a ‘non-state’.gov email address.”

On August 22, Judicial Watch released 725 pages of new State Department documents, including previously unreleased email exchanges in which Hillary Clinton top aide Huma Abedin provided influential Clinton Foundation donors special, expedited access to the secretary of state. In many instances, the preferential treatment provided to donors was at the specific request of Clinton Foundation executive Douglas Band.

###

Secret Side Iran Deals Revealed and Confirmed

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Note: Further side deals may occur and hat tip to Reuters. Expect immediate hearings when Congress returns. There is no shame with this administration including Barack Obama, John Kerry and Ben Rhodes.

JCPOA Exemptions Revealed

INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

REPORT

By David Albright and Andrea Stricker

September 1, 2016

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) placed detailed limitations on facets of Iran’s nuclear program that needed to be met by Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016.1 Most of the conditions were met by Iran. However, we have learned that some nuclear stocks and facilities were not in accordance with JCPOA limits on Implementation Day, but in anticipation the Joint Commission had earlier and secretly exempted them from the JCPOA limits. The exemptions and in one case, a loophole, involved the low enriched uranium (LEU) cap of 300 kilograms (kg), some of the near 20 percent LEU, the heavy water cap, and the number of large hot cells allowed to remain in Iran. One senior knowledgeable official stated that if the Joint Commission had not acted to create these exemptions, some of Iran’s nuclear facilities would not have been in compliance with the JCPOA by Implementation Day.

1 The Institute for Science and International Security was neutral on whether or not the JCPOA should be implemented.

Recently the Joint Commission created a Technical Working Group to consider further exemptions to Iran’s stock of 3.5 percent low enriched uranium. This cap is set at 300 kg of LEU hexafluoride but Iran apparently has or could exceed the cap if no further exemptions are granted by the Joint Commission.

The decisions of the Joint Commission have not been announced publicly. The Obama administration informed Congress of key Joint Commission decisions on Implementation Day but in a confidential manner. These decisions, which are written down, amount to additional secret or confidential documents linked to the JCPOA. Since the JCPOA is public, any rationale for keeping these exemptions secret appears unjustified. Moreover, the Joint Commission’s secretive decision making process risks advantaging Iran by allowing it to try to systematically weaken the JCPOA. It appears to be succeeding in several key areas.

Given the technical complexity and public importance of the various JCPOA exemptions and loopholes, the administration’s policy to maintain secrecy interferes in the process of establishing adequate Congressional and public oversight of the JCPOA. This is particularly true concerning potentially agreement-weakening decisions by the Joint Commission. As a matter 2 | P a g e

of policy, the United States should agree to any exemptions or loopholes in the JCPOA only if the decisions are simultaneously made public.

Exemptions

The exemptions in effect on Implementation Day include:

1) Allowing more than 300 kg of about 3.5 percent low enriched uranium hexafluoride or equivalent mass if the LEU was in the following forms:

 Low level solid waste;

 Low level liquid waste; and

 Sludge waste.

The amount of LEU hexafluoride equivalent involved in this exemption is unknown, although these amounts if not exempted would have placed Iran over the 300 kg cap, according to one knowledgeable senior official.

2) Near 20 percent LEU in “lab contaminant” that was judged as unrecoverable. Iran had agreed in the JCPOA that all near 20 percent LEU would be in fuel elements; subsequently modified to irradiated fuel elements, albeit in many cases only lightly irradiated. The amount of LEU in the lab contaminant is unknown. The basis for judging the near 20 percent LEU unrecoverable is not known.

3) A number of large hot cells. Under the JCPOA, Iran committed for 15 years to only develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions less than 6 cubic meters.2 The reason is that hot cells with these dimensions could not in practical terms be used in plutonium separation efforts involving irradiated fuel. The JCPOA also stated that larger hot cells could be operated with the approval of the Joint Commission. However, prior to Implementation Day, the Joint Commission agreed to allow Iran to continue operating 19 large hot cells in three Tehran locations and one Karaj location which are in excess of the six cubic meter limitation. Although the hot cells are used in the production of medical radionuclides they can be misused for secret, mostly small-scale plutonium separation efforts and raise serious questions over the rigorousness of this JCPOA exemption on hot cells. A related question is whether the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regularly inspects all these exempted hot cells. Moreover, Iran is

2 According to the JCPOA, “For 15 years, Iran will only develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions less than 6 cubic meters in volume compatible with the specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol. These will be co-located with the modernised Arak research reactor, the Tehran Research Reactor, and radio-medicine production complexes, and only capable of the separation and processing of industrial or medical isotopes and non-destructive PIE. The needed equipment will be acquired through the procurement mechanism established by this JCPOA. For 15 years, Iran will develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions beyond 6 cubic meters in volume and specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol, only after approval by the Joint Commission.” 3 | P a g e

 

believed to be seeking to exploit this exemption as a precedent to further increase its number of hot cells with volumes greater than six cubic meters.

Heavy Water Loophole

The Joint Commission also decided on or prior to Implementation Day that Iran would be allowed to export heavy water in excess of the JCPOA’s 130 tonnes cap for sale on the open market even though Iran did not have a buyer for this heavy water. The Joint Commission allowed Iran to store large amounts of heavy water in Oman that remained under Iran’s control, effectively allowing Iran to exceed its cap of 130 tonnes of heavy water as it continues to produce heavy water at its Arak facility.3 As discussed in an earlier Institute report, this heavy water loophole in the JCPOA was poorly considered.4 As discussed in the report, the Institute learned that the Department of Energy’s purchase of 32 tonnes of this heavy water unfairly disrupted and negatively affected a nascent, needed North American supply chain of heavy water. The Institute warned that the loophole also risked legitimizing Iran as a nuclear supplier when it had done nothing yet to prove it would abide by international norms relating to nuclear trade or halt illicit nuclear procurements. Moreover, the deal will only encourage Iran to continue exceeding the JCPOA heavy water cap for financial gain. One surprising development is that the Arak heavy water production plant produced significantly more heavy water than expected during several months following Implementation Day. Arak produced at a rate exceeding 25 tonnes per year, compared to the expected rate of 16 tonnes per year expected prior to Implementation Day.

3 One reviewer raised the question of whether this precedent could be applied to LEU, where it would be located outside of Iran even though no buyer had been found.

4 Albright and Stricker, “U.S. Purchase of Iran’s Heavy Water: Discouraging a Dangerous Nuclear Supplier,” Institute Report, May 23, 2016. http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Heavy_Water_Purchase_23May2016_final.pdf

5 David Albright, “Update on Iran’s Stocks of 3.5 Percent Low Enriched Uranium: Blocking unjustified exemptions to the 300 kilogram cap,” Institute Report, May 23, 2016, Rev. May 27, 2016. http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Update_on_Irans_Stocks_of_35_Percent_LEU_May_23_2016_Final_rev_may_27_2016.pdf

Newly Formed LEU Exemption Working Group

In July 2016 the Joint Commission established a Technical Working Group to evaluate, apparently among other stocks, the fate of approximately 100-200 kg of less than 3.67 percent LEU in the Enriched UO2 Powder Plant (EUPP).5 This plant converted LEU hexafluoride into uranium oxide and has been mothballed under the JCPOA. Although almost all of the LEU oxide produced at this plant was shipped out of Iran, a fraction was left in the process lines and tanks on Implementation Day. This LEU was not exempted on Implementation Day and was counted as part of the 300 kg LEU cap.

Russian Permanent Representative to the International Organizations in Vienna Vladimir Voronkov told TASS in July 2016 prior to an impending Joint Commission meeting: “There are two issues that need to be addressed. These are the difficulties with enriched uranium 4 | P a g e

accumulated during the enrichment in the pipes and other devices. What has been discovered exceeds the allowed limit of 300 kilograms. And the second issue is heavy water.”6

6 “Meeting of Iran-P5+1 commission on nuclear deal to be held in Vienna July 19,” TASS Russian News Agency, July 14, 2016. http://tass.ru/en/world/888165

7 With regard to domestic fuel fabrication, the JCPOA states: “Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies and its intermediate products manufactured in Iran and certified to meet international standards, including those for the modernised Arak research reactor, will not count against the 300 kg UF6 stockpile limit provided the Technical Working Group of the Joint Commission approves that such fuel assemblies and their intermediate products cannot be readily reconverted into UF6. This could for instance be achieved through impurities (e.g. burnable poisons or otherwise) contained in fuels or through the fuel being in a chemical form such that direct conversion back to UF6 would be technically difficult without dissolution and purification. The objective technical criteria will guide the approval process of the Technical Working Group. The IAEA will monitor the fuel fabrication process for any fuel produced in Iran to verify that the fuel and intermediate products comport with the fuel fabrication process that was approved by the Technical Working Group.”

It is unknown if the Joint Commission has decided to allow Iran to exceed the 300 kg cap while the Technical Working Group evaluates this issue. However, the pattern that appears to have emerged is that Iran will likely move to violate the cap if it is not granted an exemption.

The JCPOA is silent on the issue of exempting from the 300 kg cap already existing LEU that had been produced in Iran. In fact, US officials told Institute staff in the summer of 2015 that Iran was fully expected to empty the EUPP of LEU and send it all out of the country or dilute it to natural uranium.

Although the JCPOA explicitly created exemptions to the 300 kg cap, such as Russian designed, fabricated and licensed fuel assemblies for use in Russian-supplied reactors in Iran, these exemptions do not appear to cover the exemption of any remaining LEU in the EUPP. According to the JCPOA, “All enriched uranium hexafluoride in excess of 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched UF6 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) will be down blended to natural uranium level or be sold on the international market and delivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran.”

The JCPOA envisions that Iran may make LEU fuel domestically in the future and contains a mechanism to exempt that LEU from the cap as long as Iran meets stringent conditions. To that end, the JCPOA states: “The Joint Commission will establish a Technical Working Group with the goal of enabling fuel to be fabricated in Iran while adhering to the agreed stockpile parameters (300 kg of up to 3.67 % enriched UF6 or the equivalent in different chemical forms).” However, the exemptions specified in the JCPOA are intended for future fuel fabrication, and do not appear applicable to LEU processed in the EUPP prior to Implementation Day.7 The JCPOA intended that existing, domestically produced LEU enriched up to 3.67 percent would be subject to the 300 kg cap and not exempted.

However, the Joint Commission has taken a different approach and has already exempted existing LEU as part of bringing Iran into compliance with the JCPOA on Implementation Day. Moreover, it did so without relying on the Technical Working Group as called for in the JCPOA. 5 | P a g e

Now, there is concern that the newly formed Technical Working Group will lay the basis to exempt more LEU from the cap. Moreover, the intention appears to be to conduct these discussions and the associated decision making about LEU exemptions in secret, without any public scrutiny.

These exemptions matter because the LEU may be recoverable by Iran in a breakout to produce highly enriched uranium, thereby lowering breakout times. Separating LEU from its chemical constituents in such products is typically straightforward.

While Iran and its allies may today view the LEU as non-recoverable, that view does not appear to be a sufficient standard to meet the JCPOA conditions or prevent the LEU’s use in a breakout. A country intent on breaking out and making highly enriched uranium as national priorities may make an entirely different calculation about the LEU’s worth and devote considerable effort to recovering the LEU, such as during a push to acquire nuclear weapons in a crisis.

Any discussion of such an important issue as exempting LEU from the 300 kilogram cap or from export should be public and subject to more rigorous oversight. The exemption process and the Joint Commission decisions should be transparent; the current arrangement has been overly secret and amounts to the generation of additional secret or confidential arrangements directly linked to the JCPOA that do not have adequate oversight and scrutiny. Moreover, the process in general raises the question of whether Iran is exploiting the exemption mechanism, outside of any public oversight, to systematically weaken as many JCPOA limitations as possible. The US administration should insist that the exemption process and decisions be public and transparent.