New Mexico Compound was Training for School Shooting

Timeline:

TAOS, N.M. (AP) — The Latest on 11 children found living in a filthy, makeshift compound in New Mexico (all times local):

12:30 p.m.

Prosecutors say in court documents that the father of a missing Georgia boy was training children at a New Mexico compound to commit school shootings.

The documents filed Wednesday say Siraj Ibn Wahhaj (see-DAHJ’ IBN wah-HAJ’) was conducting weapons training at the compound near the Colorado border where 11 hungry children were found in filthy conditions.

Prosecutors filed the documents while asking that Wahhaj be held without bail.

Wahhaj was arrested last week with four other adults. They are facing child abuse charges.

Authorities say the remains of a boy also were found on the compound but have not been positively identified by a medical examiners.

__

9:30 a.m.

New Mexico officials investigating a makeshift compound where 11 children were found hungry plan to ask a judge to hold the father of a missing boy without bail.

New Mexico 8th Judicial District Attorney Donald Gallegos said Tuesday that prosecutors are putting together evidence to ask a judge to hold Siraj Ibn Wahhaj (see-DAHJ’ IBN wah-HAJ’) without bond.

A warrant from Georgia seeks the extradition of Wahhaj to face a charge of abducting his son from that state last December.

He is scheduled to appear in a Taos County court on Wednesday. Wahhaj and four other adults also face felony child abuse charges after a raid by authorities found the 11 children living in filth.

The missing boy was not among the children found in that initial search but authorities say they found the remains of a child that they are working to identify.

___

12 a.m.

The father of a missing boy is due in court Wednesday as authorities work to identify a child’s remains uncovered in an isolated New Mexico compound where he was arrested last week.

A warrant from Georgia seeks the extradition of Siraj Ibn Wahhaj to face a charge of abducting his son from that state last December.

Wahhaj and four other adults also face felony child abuse charges after a raid by authorities revealed 11 hungry children living in filth.

The missing boy was not among the children found in that initial search.

The district attorney said he would withhold comment on the potential for additional charges until investigators identified the remains found on the site.

***

CORRECTS LAST NAME TO MORTON, NOT MORTEN – This photo provided by the Taos County Sheriff’s Department shows Lucas Morton, left, and Siraj Wahhaj. Morton and Wahhaj were arrested after law enforcement officers searching a rural northern New Mexico compound for a missing 3-year-old boy found 11 children in filthy conditions and hardly any food. (Taos County Sheriff’s Department via AP)

For months, neighbors worried about a squalid compound built along a remote New Mexico plain, saying they brought their concerns to authorities long before sheriff’s officials first found 11 hungry children on the lot, and then the remains of a small boy.

Two men and three women also had been living at the compound, and were arrested following a raid Friday that came as officials searched for a missing Georgia boy with severe medical issues.

Medical examiners still must confirm whether the body found at the property in a second search on Monday is that of Abdul-ghani Wahhaj, who was 3 in December when police say his father took him from his mother in Jonesboro, Georgia.

The boy’s father, Siraj Ibn Wahhaj, was among those arrested in the compound raid that has since resulted in the series of startling revelations on the outskirts of Amalia, a tiny town near the Colorado state line marked by scattered homes and sagebrush. Authorities said they found the father armed with multiple firearms, including an assault rifle.

Siraj Ibn Wahhaj was scheduled to appear in court Wednesday on a warrant from Georgia that seeks his extradition to face a charge of abducting his son from that state last December. He had expressed wanting to perform an exorcism on his son, the warrant said.

The group arrived in Amalia in December, with enough money to buy groceries and construction supplies, according to Tyler Anderson, a 41-year-old auto mechanic who lives nearby.

He said Tuesday he helped the newcomers install solar panels after they arrived but eventually stopped visiting.

Anderson said he met both of the men in the group, but never the women, who authorities have said are the mothers of the 11 children, ages 1 to 15.

Anderson did not recall seeing the Georgia boy who was missing. But he said some of the smaller children from the compound turned up to play with children at neighboring properties after the group first arrived.

“We just figured they were doing what we were doing, getting a piece of land and getting off the grid,” said Anderson, who moved to New Mexico from Seattle with his wife seven years ago.

As the months passed, however, they stopped seeing the smaller children playing in the area. They also stopped hearing guns fired off at a shooting range on the property, he said.

Jason Badger, who owned the property where the compound was built, said he and his wife had pressed authorities to remove the group after becoming concerned about the children. The group had built the compound on their acreage instead of a neighboring tract owned by Lucas Morton, one of the men arrested during the raid.

“I started to try and kick them off about three months ago and everything I tried to do kept getting knocked down,” said Badger said.

A judge dismissed an eviction notice filed by Badger against Morton in June, court records said. The records did not provide further details on the judge’s decision.

After the raid, Anderson went over and looked at the property for the first time in months.

“I was flabbergasted from what it had turned into from the last time I saw it,” he said.

Authorities said the compound shielded by old tires, wooden pallets and an earthen wall studded with broken glass had been littered with “odorous trash.”

The 11 children found living at the encampment — described as a small trailer embedded in the ground — had been without clean water and appeared to have not eaten in days, according to Taos County Sheriff Jerry Hogrefe.

At a news conference in Taos, Hogrefe described FBI surveillance efforts in recent months that included photographs of the compound and interviews. He said the images were shared with the mother of Abdul-ghani but she did not spot her son, and that the photographs never indicated the boy’s father was at the compound.

“I had no probable cause to get a search warrant to go onto this property,” the sheriff said.

He said FBI officials were invited to the news conference but declined to attend. An FBI spokesman did not immediately return a call seeking comment.

Hogrefe said the “breaking point” in seeking a search warrant came when Georgia authorities received a message that may have originated within the compound that children were starving inside.

It was not clear who sent the message or how it was communicated. Georgia detectives forwarded it to the Taos County Sheriff’s Office.

Authorities returned to search the compound after interviews on Friday and Saturday led them to believe the boy might still be on the property.

“We discovered the remains yesterday on Abdul’s fourth birthday,” Hogrefe said, appearing to fight back tears.

Aleks Kostich, managing attorney in the Taos County public defender’s office, said the office was gathering information and assigning attorneys to the defendants. He declined to comment on their behalf, saying the case was in its early stages.

However, he questioned the “legal sufficiency” of the criminal complaints filed against the men and women, saying they were vague.

“I’m not sure how much investigating has been done,” he said. “I’m not sure how much law enforcement knows and how long they’ve known it for.”

___

AP writers Kate Brumback in Jonesboro, Georgia, contributed to this report. Hudetz reported from Albuquerque.

The Process for Fallen Troops’ Identities

When her duty day is over, Army Sgt. 1st Class Jennifer Owen often wonders if she did enough to help identify fallen service members.

A lab worker examines personal effects that may have belonged to a fallen service member.

Army Sgt. 1st Class Jennifer Owen, a morgue noncommissioned officer for the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency, examines a personal effect that may have belonged to a fallen service member in a laboratory at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, March 12, 2018. Army photo by Sean Kimmons

As the noncommissioned officer in charge of the morgue at the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency, which is tasked to account for more than 82,000 Americans missing from past conflicts, she analyzes human remains and personal effects in hopes to close a cold case.

“At the end of the day, I have to be able to look in the mirror and say I’ve done my best,” she said. “And when I get up in the morning, I say I’m going to do better, because these families have been waiting years and years.”

Owens is one of about 100 service members and civilians who work at the agency’s laboratories here and at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska. Each year, the labs identify the remains of around 200 Americans that are then reunited with families.

On Aug. 1, more than 50 cases containing remains believed to be those of American service members were provided to DPAA by North Korea.

The remains are now undergoing further analysis and identification at the labs.

The painstaking work, which can take months to years to complete, is Owen’s passion. Whenever a positive identification comes in, she said, it is as if the service member’s name is given back.

‘These Are All Heroes’

“What drives me the most is that these are heroes,” she said, looking across a lab holding hundreds of unknown remains. “These are all heroes [who] have a name and a family.”

Each year, DPAA conducts up to 80 investigation and recovery team missions throughout the world to pinpoint last known locations of missing Americans and to attempt to excavate their remains.

“The work is complex, the work is difficult, and it takes that dedication, that passion … to be able to perform this solemn obligation that we make to the nation and to the families,” said Kelly McKeague, the agency’s director.

The joint agency, which employs many service members and veterans, has agreements with nearly 50 nations that assist in its missions, he added.

Most of the missing fell at World War II battle sites in the Pacific region. There are also almost 7,700 service members unaccounted for from the Korean War, with the majority believed to be in North Korea.

DPAA teams were allowed to conduct missions in North Korea from 1996 to 2005, but operations were halted as diplomatic relations deteriorated in the region. Agency officials hope these missions could soon start up again.

Before he became the agency’s lab director, John Byrd had the opportunity to help recover Americans who fought in North Korea at the Battle of Unsan. The 1950 battle pitted Chinese forces against American and South Korean troops.

When remains are identified by his staff it is always a testament to good field and lab work that solved the decades-old case, Byrd said.

“It’s extremely gratifying,” he said, “and it kind of keeps you grounded where you know why you’re here and why you’re doing this work.”

DNA Testing

A majority of DPAA cases involve some type of DNA testing. Samples are taken from the remains and sent to the Armed Forces DNA Identification Lab in Delaware.

To help this process, family members who have a missing loved one are encouraged to provide a DNA sample that will serve as a comparison.

If no reference samples are on file, a battalion of professional genealogists working for service casualty offices will try to locate family members.

Many times their starting point is the service member’s home address from the 1940s, if they served in World War II. This makes it extremely difficult to track down a living family member as the years pass on.

“It’s one of the greatest challenges of all. How do you find close family members of a missing serviceman from 1944?” Byrd asked. “It’s not easy. Some [cases] we run into dead-ends and we can’t find anybody.”

The Defense Department has kept dental records of troops dating back to World War I that can be used to help in the identification process.

In 2005, the agency also discovered another method that has proved successful. Many troops who served in early conflicts had to get chest X-rays as part of a tuberculosis screening when they first signed up.

Like the dental records, these radiographs were stored in a warehouse by the DoD. DPAA later obtained thousands of copies of them. Lab personnel use them as a comparison tool, since the shape of each person’s chest is different.

“The process of comparing this induction chest x-ray to an x-ray we take from the remains is analogous to doing fingerprint comparison,” Byrd said. “It’s a very similar kind of mindset that you take when you look at the two side-by-side; you’re looking for commonalities and differences.”

When a service member is identified, family members often come to the lab so they can participate in escorting the remains back home, he said. For those who work at the lab, those family member visits make the months or years of work seem worthwhile.

“When you have a family member come in and the staff who actually worked on the case get to meet them, they get to see the tangible results of their hard work,” Byrd said. “It’s definitely a boost to their morale.”

In the Field

Before that sort of closure can start for families, recovery teams spend weeks at a time doing the grunt work of excavating sites.

Army Capt. Brandon Lucas, who serves as a team leader, recalled his team digging nearly 20 feet into the ground in Laos in search of an F-4 Phantom fighter pilot who vanished during the Vietnam War.

A lab worker holds an item under a magnifying panel.

Army Sgt. 1st Class Jennifer Owen, a morgue noncommissioned officer for the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency, examines a personal effect that may have belonged to a fallen service member in a laboratory at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, March 12, 2018. Army photo by Sean Kimmons

While no remains were found on that mission, they were still able to confidently close the site and shift efforts elsewhere.

Then there was another mission in Slovenia, where the tail gunner of a bomber aircraft from World War II went missing.

When his plane crashed, the gunner was the only one in his aircrew killed. Residents later buried him next to a church.

As Lucas’ team arrived at the site, the townspeople still knew about the crash and the gunner. Residents regularly visited his team, often bringing Lucas and the others food and drinks. An elderly woman even told him that for decades she would clean the grave site once a week.

When his team recovered the remains, a somber tone spread through the community.

“A lot of them actually shed tears when we found the remains,” Lucas said. “It was special to them and it was special to me.”

The poignant moment, along with others he has experienced during missions, galvanized the meaning of the mission for him.

“I’m potentially bringing back a fallen comrade,” Lucas said. “I would want to know that if it was me lost out there somebody is trying to recover me and give my family closure.”

Maritime Recovery

Recovery missions also extend out into the sea, where many service members have disappeared as a result of aircraft crashes or ships sunk.

While she served as commander of the 8th Theater Sustainment Command, Army Maj. Gen. Susan A. Davidson was an advocate for her unit to support the solemn mission.

The unit regularly supplies DPAA with highly-trained Army divers from the 7th Engineer Dive Detachment, who often work on the sea floor with no visibility and use a suction hose to remove loose sediment from recovery sites.

On a barge, team members then sift through the sediment for the remains or personal effects of those missing.

When divers returned to Hawaii, she encouraged them to share their experiences and what they got out of the mission with others in the unit.

“They come back a different person and they have a different respect for our Army and for what we do,” Davidson said.

Back at the lab, Owen and others strive to identity those heroes who have been found.

“I feel that I am part of something so much bigger that I can contribute to,” she said.

Chinese/Russian Subs Prowling East Coast, Atlantic

In a press gaggle today, a member of the media asked Secretary of Defense Mattis:

Q:  Mr. Secretary, you stated you’re watching submarines in the North Atlantic and elsewhere.  But are Russia and China putting more submarines out to look at the United States than they have since the Cold War?   

SEC. MATTIS:  Yes, we always keep an eye on the — on the submarines at sea.  And I’d prefer not to say anymore than that.  Thanks.

Humm, okay let’s go deeper.

The Navy reactivated a the fleet responsible for overseeing the East Coast and the North Atlantic. The 2nd Fleet was deactivated in 2011 and Secretary Mattis upped the defense strategy earlier this year.

We do know that the Russians are snooping around all undersea telecommunications cables used by NATO. The Russian submarines are equipped with anti-submarine missiles and little is published about the Chinese submarines. Meanwhile, the United States has deployed patrols using manned and unmanned surface ships, attack submarines and air surveillance by the P-8 Poseidon, a sub hunting warplane.

Crew | USS SOUTH DAKOTA SSN 790

The most advanced US advanced fast attack submarine named the USS South Dakota is equipped with the most advanced technology including advanced stealth features.

“China is improving the lethality and survivability of its attack submarines and building quieter, high-end diesel and nuclear-powered submarines,” he said.
Both China and Russia have also increased their presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, where Harris said 230 of the world’s 400 foreign submarines are operating.
Roughly 160 of those 230 submarines belong to China, North Korea, and Russia, according to Harris.
Forbes said the United States must also develop a strategy to counter Chinese and Russian activity in “gray zones” where they are incrementally expanding their presence by strategically “fighting and competing” through military posturing.
China’s claims in the South China Sea represent one glaring example as to how they’ve been able to successfully implement this type of strategy in a way that allows them to expand their military reach without engaging in direct confrontation, according to Forbes.

Meanwhile, a significant upgrade has taken place and that is to SOSUS.

Now, in what may be the biggest upgrade to the Navy’s fixed undersea surveillance system since the Cold War, General Dynamics has been recently awarded a contract by the Office of Naval Research to develop the Deep Reliable Acoustic Path Exploitation System (DRAPES). DRAPES appears to be part of a suite of upgrades to the Navy’s submarine detection capabilities to cope with expanding fleets of advanced submarines around the world.

When the Cold War ended, the U.S. Navy no longer faced a “peer threat” to its control of the seas and many capabilities and weapons necessary for defeating advanced adversary ships and submarines were decommissioned. Research for more advanced follow-on technology was also put on hold. After operating 30 undersea surveillance sites around the world during the Cold War, the Navy has only three operational today. But as Russia, and especially China, have developed larger and more advanced submarine fleets, the U.S. Navy has had to re-learn old Cold War anti-submarine warfare competencies while developing new capabilities to tackle more challenging modern submarine technology.

While the Navy says relatively little about the advanced sub-hunting capabilities of the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS), of which SOSUS is a part, some IUSS systems have received more public attention. The afloat Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) is a small fleet of civilian-crewed ships that carry sensitive towed listening (passive) arrays that can detect submarines from great distances. These ships grabbed headlines in 2009 when the SURTASS ship USNS Impeccable was harassed by Chinese Maritime Militia while operating in the vicinity of China’s South China Sea submarine bases on Hainan Island. The SURTASS ships have also received technical upgrades since the Cold War. The introduction of the Low Frequency Active (LFA) capability, an “active” system that transmits low frequency “pings” that bounce off of submarine hulls and are then picked up by the existing passive SURTASS arrays dramatically increases their ability to detect submarines at great distances.

By contrast, little is known publicly about the SOSUS networks after the Cold War. Defense Systems reports that DRAPES, like SOSUS, will be a fixed passive listening system with a new communications capability to transmit its data. Mobile systems like SURTASS have the advantage of being able to get closer to possible contacts and follow them, but can only be in one place at a time, and must eventually return to port. Fixed systems like SOSUS, and now DRAPES, have the advantage of providing permanent coverage over target areas and then “cueing” a mobile sensor capability, like a ship or aircraft, to zero in on a submarine it detects.

One reason there were 30 IUSS sites during the Cold War is that the SOSUS systems had to be connected to collection facilities by underwater cable, requiring sites to be relatively local to the target area. But DRAPES will apparently use a new underwater communications system to transmit the acoustic data it collects to the three remaining Navy Operational Processing Facilities (NOPFs). These facilities combine data from the static SOSUS networks and SURTASS ships to provide “detection, localization, and tracking of submarines.” DRAPES’ ability to provide wide coverage from a fixed location in the ocean, apparently without the need for additional NOPF facility footprints, would be a substantial improvement over the old SOSUS network.

As China and Russia have asserted themselves anew as “pacing competitors,” as described by Undersecretary of Defense Robert Work, the U.S. Navy has taken a renewed interest in its traditional Cold War antisubmarine warfare mission. Together, DRAPES and SURTASS promise to provide a persistent, long-range ability to detect adversary submarines around the globe. Using cueing data from those platforms, improved local anti-submarine assets like the P-8 Poseidon sub hunter aircraft (which replaces the 50 year-old P-3 Orion) and surface combatants with new, improved towed sonar arrays of their own, like the Multi-Function Towed Array, can then close on a target, and track or engage it as needed.

MisInformationCom and Election Security

Election security top priority for U.S.: DHS chief - newsR ...
So, Dana Perino of Fox News/Daily Briefing had Mary Anne Marsh on the show today to discuss voting security. Mary Ann went on and on about how the Trump administration is not doing enough to ensure foreign interference/election meddling is prevented in the 2018 mid-terms and all the way to the general election in 2020.
Clearly Mary Ann has not been a part of the countless sessions that DHS has hosted for the benefit of each state to protect and harden their respective systems. Frankly, I have participated in 2 conference calls and have watched congressional hearings as well as read documents provided as to the activities on behalf of DHS and the FBI.
Then while few people know, the Justice Department produced a lengthy document by the titled ‘The Cyber Digital Task Force that speaks to all foreign intrusion operations including the matter of the election infrastructure. Pass this on to Mary Ann please. Just one of hundreds of paragraphs is below:
Covert influence operations, including disinformation operations, to influence
public opinion and sow division.
Using false U.S. personas, adversaries could covertly create and operate social media pages and other forums designed to attract U.S. audiences and spread disinformation or divisive messages. This could happen in isolation or in combination with other operations, and could be intended to foster specific narratives that advance foreign political objectives, or could be intended simply to turn citizens against each other. These messages need not relate directly to political campaigns. They could seek to depress voter turnout among particular groups, encourage third-party voting, or convince the public of widespread voter fraud to undermine confidence in election results. These messages could target discrete U.S. populations based on their political
and demographic characteristics. They may mobilize Americans to sign online petitions
and join issue-related rallies and protests, or even to incite violence. For example, advertisements from at least 2015 to 2017 linked to a Russian organization called the Internet Research Agency focused on divisive issues, including illegal immigration and gun rights, among others, and targeted those messages to groups most likely to react.
Meanwhile, there is an external organization made up of subject matter experts collecting evidence and stories of which the Deputy Assistant Attorney General Adam S. Hickey for the National Security Division Delivered Remarks at Misinfo Con.
Thank you for the invitation to speak today, and for the important work you are doing: in organizing this conference devoted to the challenges of misinformation, and, by attending, bringing your experience and expertise to bear on the problem.

It’s a privilege to help kick off this first day of MisinfoCon, focused on state-sponsored misinformation. To do that, I am going to give you an overview of how the Department of Justice views the problem, where it fits in the context of related national security threats, and how we are addressing it.

As you probably know, the Justice Department recently obtained an indictment of 13 Russian individuals and three entities, including the Internet Research Agency (or IRA), for federal crimes in connection with an effort to interfere in the 2016 Presidential election. The defendants allegedly conducted what they called “information warfare against the United States,” with the stated goal of “spread[ing] distrust towards the candidates and the political system in general.”

According to the indictment, the IRA was a structured organization headed by a management group and arranged in departments. It had a “translator project,” designed to focus on the U.S. population, with more than 80 employees assigned by July 2016. They posed as politically and socially active Americans, advocating for and against particular political candidates. They established social media pages and groups to communicate with unwitting Americans. They also purchased political advertisements on social media.

One of the so-called trolls who worked for the IRA recently spoke to the Washington Post about his work in a different department, attempting to influence a domestic, Russian audience. He described it as “a place where you have to write that white is black and black is white.” Hundreds of people “were all writing absolute untruths.”

But as the indictment alleges it, what made the defendants’ conduct illegal in the United States was not the substance of their message, the “accuracy” of their opinions: it was their conspiracy to defraud by, among other ways, lying about who the messenger was.  They were not Americans expressing their own viewpoints; they were Russians on the payroll of a foreign company.

Now, the problem of covert foreign influence is not new. In 1938, a congressional committee found that the Nazi government had established an extensive, underground propaganda apparatus inside the United States using American firms and citizens. The response was to recommend a law that would (in the committee’s words) throw these activities under the “spotlight of pitiless publicity.”  The result is the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), a disclosure statute that, notably, does not prohibit speech. Rather, FARA requires agents of foreign principals who engage in political activities within the United States to file periodic public disclosures with the Department.

The Act’s purpose is to ensure that the American public and our lawmakers know the source of information provided at the behest of a foreign principal, enhancing the public’s and the government’s ability to evaluate such information.

Transparency, not prohibition, has been the government’s response to misinformation. In the 1980s, the government established an interagency committee, the “Active Measures Working Group,” to counter Soviet disinformation. It did so by exposing forgeries and other propaganda, such as fake stories that the Pentagon developed the AIDS virus as part of a biological weapons research program.

Today, we confront misinformation as only one component of a broader, malign foreign influence effort.  As this framework from the Department’s recent Cyber-Digital Task Force report shows, those efforts can also include cyber operations that target election infrastructure or political parties’ networks; covert efforts to assist (or harm) candidates; and overt efforts to influence the American public (for example, through state-run media organizations).

Our responses to those efforts must likewise be multifaceted, from providing indicators and warnings that can help network owners protect themselves from hackers, to criminal investigations and prosecutions, and other measures, like sanctions and expulsions that raise the costs on the states that sponsor such malign activities.

This graphic, also from the Task Force report, depicts the Department’s strategy to counter each phase of a covert influence campaign cycle, from the identification of targets to the production and amplification of content.  The middle rows (in red) depict our adversaries’ activities in stages, while the bottom rows (in blue) suggest the means by which private actors and the government can disrupt and deter the activity.

One aspect of this strategy worth highlighting is that the content of a foreign influence campaign may be true or false.  Whether the message is accurate or not may not be the point: doxing a candidate or a corporation for political reasons might not involve misinformation, but it may nonetheless violate our laws, threaten our values and way of life, compromise privacy and, sometimes, retaliate against and chill free speech.

Covert foreign influence efforts can take many forms, but recently we have seen increased efforts to influence Americans through social media. To counter these efforts, a key component of our approach is sharing information with social media and other Internet service providers, which we do through the FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force.  It is those providers who bear the primary responsibility for securing their own products and platforms.  By sharing information with them, especially about who certain users and account holders actually are, we can assist their own, voluntary initiatives to track foreign influence activity and to enforce their own terms of service.

As the Task Force report also recognizes, there may be circumstances when it is appropriate for the government itself to expose and attribute foreign influence operations as a means of rendering them less effective. But there are often compelling, countervailing considerations, however.

As a general rule, the Department does not confirm, deny, or comment on pending investigations, both to protect the investigation itself as well as the rights of any accused.

We are also constrained to protect the classified sources and methods that may inform our judgment of what foreign governments are doing.

And, most important of all, we must never act to confer any advantage or disadvantage on any political or social group, individual, or organization, and we must strive to avoid even the appearance of partiality. That could constrain the timing and nature of any disclosure we might make.

All of this is to say, and as the Department’s Policy on the Disclosure of Foreign Influence Operations recognizes, we might not be the best messenger to counter a particular piece of misinformation.

That’s why this conference is so important: what we call the private sector (but which includes a lot of people in public spaces, just like you) has a critical role – larger than the federal government’s – in countering covert foreign influence efforts, particularly misinformation, and ensuring that our democracy rests on the active engagement of an informed public.

The former Russian troll I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks, who worked for the IRA, said his work was “pointless” for Russian audiences, that it would not impact them.  But in America, that kind of trickery might have an impact, he said, because we “live in a society in which it’s accepted to answer for your words.” My challenge to us during this conference, if I may make one, is that we find ways to ensure we all continue to answer for our words, so that the trust we enjoy as an aspect of our free, democratic society can thrive.

*** Someone help out the democrats and Mary Ann….all discussions inside the Beltway include these multi-track discussions. Back in March, the U.S. spending bill provided $380 million for election cyber security. There was an amendment for an additional $250 million that the Senate Republicans on a floor vote rejected. Why? Because many of the states have either been slow to accept money inside that $380 million or not taken any at all.

Russia Posturing to Own Space, then China?

The U.S. military will soon be using lasers to shoot down ...

photo

Right now, miles above your head, there are fleets of robotic, weaponized satellites poised to do battle as the world’s superpowers await the opening salvo in a very real cosmic chess match.

When it comes to Russia, the real cause for concern surrounds a mysterious object known cryptically as 2014-28E. The object first appeared in space soon after the launch of three Russian military communication satellites. Initially, many believed 2014-28E was just another piece of debris left over from the launch. Not long afterward, however, this hunk of space junk began to swiftly change orbit, demonstrating an onboard propulsion system. What exactly 2014-28E is is still unknown, as the Russians have remained tight-lipped on the matter. Many experts fear that these actions signal that the Russians have revived their allegedly-defunct operation known as Istrebitel Sputnik (meaning “Satellite Fighter”), a covert Soviet-era ASAT program.

Russian and Chinese officials have continuously accused the United States of spying on the Chinese Space Station with a top-secret space toy known officially as X-37B. This craft is essentially an unmanned version of the Space Shuttle with a payload bay that’s roughly the size of a pickup truck bed. However, what exactly will be carried and what has been carried on its previous three missions is classified. So too is the entire X-37B budget. Many aeronautic experts dispute claims that the U.S. is using this craft to spy on the Chinese Space Station — but, the complete lack of transparency from U.S. officials hasn’t helped thaw frigid relations between the involved parties.

And the X-37B definitely isn’t the only trick the U.S. has up its proverbial sleeve. Some of America’s most sophisticated ASAT technology is in development as we speak. DARPA, the research and development wing of the U.S. Department of Defense, is now quickly moving along with its Phoenix initiative. The program is based around the concept of a series of robotic craft with the ability to repair damaged satellites from the scraps parts of other defunct satellites already in orbit. Again, from a foreign military perspective, if a satellite has the ability to build something, that satellite also has the intrinsic ability to dismantle something — say, an enemy satellite. More here from Digital Trends.

Russia Will Fight to Be World’s Top Space Power, Agency Chief Says

Russia is ready to do “serious battle” for the title of leading space power in the world, the head of the country’s state space agency has said.

Moscow’s Roscosmos has become the subject of some ridicule, following budget cuts and high-profile setbacks, including a recent botched launch that resulted in the loss of a multimillion dollar silo of satellites. The agency still regards itself as heir to Russia’s Soviet legacy of space exploration and Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly urged officials to recapture that status in the world, telling agency employees last month that Roscosmos needed “breakthrough successes” to do so.

Roscosmos Director Dmitry Rogozin gave a defiant message on the agency’s ambitions.

“We are not looking to surrender leadership in space to anyone,” Rogozin said at the opening of a satellite equipment manufacturing plant in Yaroslavl region. The director, who served as Russia’s deputy prime minister until May, admitted that the agency had “fallen behind from the leading positions” in recent years.

08_06_Rogozin Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin (front left) gestures at Russian President Vladimir Putin (front center) and others as they visit a space exhibition in Moscow, on April 12. Maxim Shipenkov/AFP/Getty Images

Roscosmos unveiled a brand new spaceport in eastern Russia in 2016, although Putin reportedly reprimanded senior officials in private after the launching ceremony, which he had gone to watch, suffered a 24-hour delay. More here.

Just two years ago:

So why is there so much global interest in space at the moment, including in Australia, and what are countries around the world doing up there right now?

Space remains ‘hugely contested’ in 2018

Modern militaries rely on satellites that feed them vital intelligence.

As a result, “counterspace” weapons have become a rising area of interest, and earlier this year, US intelligence agencies warned that China and Russia were both working on “destructive counterspace weapons” for use in a future conflict.

The potential weapons US intelligence agencies were concerned about included both ground-launched missiles capable of taking out enemy satellites, as well as “directed-energy weapons” that could blind or damage the sensors on satellite instruments.

The US intelligence agencies said in their report that both China and Russia would probably have operational weapons within a few years.

China last month launched a communications satellite named Magpie Bridge that is currently sitting in a special orbit near the moon, giving it a view of both the Earth and the so-far-unexplored dark side of the Moon.

That feat was praised in official Chinese state media Xinhua as a “world first”.

The plan is for the satellite to beam continuous images of the dark side of the moon, with China looking set to become the first country to land a rover there later this year.

China is also planning on setting up a permanent robotic base on the lunar surface in the next 10 years, and is hoping for a manned mission in the 2030s.